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Merrill Lynch v. Dabit: Federal 
Preemption of Holders' Class Actions 
By Mark J. Loewenstein* 
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 1 the U.S. Su-
preme Court decided a seemingly narrow question of statutory interpreta-
tion, yet made a significant statement about federal-state jurisdiction in 
securities litigation. At issue was whether the Securities Litigation Uni-
form Standards Act of 19982 (SLUSA) prohibits the maintenance of a 
class action under state law alleging that the defendant fraudulently in-
duced the plaintiff class to hold - as opposed to purchase or sell- certain 
securities. The Court held that it did, thus ending the litigation. While the 
Court had sound reasons for reaching this conclusion, there were also 
strong arguments leaning in the other direction. In the end, the Court 
chose an outcome that furthered a trend in its securities law jurisprudence 
limiting the role of state law. This article analyzes the Dabit decision, 
both on its on terms and in the context of the Court's recent decisions in 
the securities law area. 
I. The Litigation 
Dab it arose out of the scandal surrounding analysts' reports issued by 
the country's leading investment banks. This case, and others, alleged 
that those reports fraudulently induced investors to hold the subject secu-
rities; if the truth had been told, the investors allegedly would have sold. 
The complaints also alleged that investment banks encouraged such 
fraudulent reports to enhance their ability to attract investment banking 
business from the reported-on companies. 3 On these facts, the investors 
could not maintain actions under Rule 10b-5, because they did not pur-
chase or sell. securities on the basis of fraudulent statements, as required 
by the 1975 Supreme Court decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores. 4 So, foreclosed from a federal cause of action, the investors in 
Dabit filed state law claims alleging breach of fiduciary duty and breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.5 
*Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School, Boulder, Colorado. The author thanks 
Michael Delcour for his valuable research assistance. 
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A class action alleging state law claims in the securities law area, how-
ever, implicates SLUSA. Passed by Congress in 1998, this Act was de-
signed to close a loophole that had developed under the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 19956 (the Reform Act). The Reform Act was 
intended to limit securities class actions by imposing various substantive 
and procedural requirements on such actions. 7 As a result of the Reform 
Act, securities class action litigation began to migrate to state courts, or 
allege state claims in federal diversity actions. 8 By filing state law ac-
tions, plaintiffs were able to avoid the onerous requirements of the Re-
form Act. In response, Congress passed SLUSA, providing that no "cov-
ered class actions" may be maintained under state law.9 In short, and sub-
ject to certain exceptions, covered class actions are those that allege fraud 
in connection with the purchase or sale of a publicly traded security. 10 
In Dabit, the defendants sought to dismiss the complaint on the basis 
that it was preempted by SL USA and therefore could not be maintained 
under state law, even as a diversity action in federal court. 11 The district 
court agreed, 12 but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed, 13 holding that because the complaint did not allege that plaintiffs 
were fraudulently induced to purchase or sell securities, the cause of ac-
tion was not preempted by SL USA. Put differently, in the view of the ap-
pellate court, a "holders" class action may be maintained notwithstanding 
the broad preemptive reach of SLUSA. 
Thus, the narrow issue before the Supreme Court was how to read the 
provision in SLUSA that preempted class actions alleging fraud "in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of a covered security."14 Literally, plain-
tiffs were not claiming that they were defrauded in buying or selling any 
security, but rather that they were defrauded by being induced not to 
sell. 15 Moreover, because Blue Chip Stamps held that Rule 1 Ob-5 does 
not provide a remedy to those who are dissuaded from purchasing or sell-
ing a security, plaintiffs argued that if they could not maintain a class ac-
tion under state law, they could not maintain a class action at all. 16 
Although these arguments persuaded the appellate court, the Supreme 
Court was unmoved. 17 Instead, the Court opted for a broad, non-literal 
reading of the "purchase and sale" requirement of SLUSA, thereby ex-
panding the reach of that legislation. 18 In so doing, the Court clarified the 
meaning of Blue Chip Stamps, describing it as a case that merely limited 
standing to maintain a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5.19 Of 
equal importance, the Court said that Blue Chip Stamps was based on 
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policy considerations, not an interpretation of statutory language.20 By so 
cabining Blue Chip Stamps, the Court answered the argument that the 
phrase "purchase or sale" must mean the same thing in Rule 1 Ob-5 as it 
does in SL USA. The Court essentially said that the phrase does mean the 
same thing in both provisions; because Blue Chip Stamps only deals with 
standing for private damage actions and not statutory interpretation, that 
precedent is not to the contrary. 
One problem faced by the Dabit Court was whether the phrase "pur-
chase and sale," as employed in SL USA, has such a plain meaning that the 
Court could reach a different result through interpretation. Interestingly, the 
Court did not even consider the potential "plain meaning" of the term, de-
spite ample precedents that suggest that plain meaning is the first inquiry in 
statutory interpretation. 21 Of even greater interest is the fact that Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, who have frequently chided the Court for ignoring the 
plain meaning of statutes or the Constitution, did not write separately in 
this case to address this lurking plain meaning problem.Z2 
Eschewing, at least implicitly, the plain meaning rule, the Court in-
stead relied on its decisions that gave a broad meaning to Rule 10b-5.23 
The Court cited Superintendent of Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life 
& Casualty Co.,24 SEC v. Zandford,25 and United States v. O'Hagan26 as 
cases that demonstrate that "it is enough that the fraud alleged 'coincide' 
with a securities transaction-whether by the plaintiff or by someone 
else."27 Only the first of these, however, was a private damage action. In 
the latter two cases, which are discussed in section III below, the Court 
was not faced with the interpretation question faced here. The Court de-
cided that where there is a sufficient link betWeen a securities transaction 
- a purchase or sale - and the fraud, an action may be maintained under 
Rule 10b-5. Superintendent of Insurance, a truly inscrutable decision, 
stands for the same proposition. But all of this begs the question, which is 
whether the fraud alleged in Dab it would constitute a violation of Rule 
1 Ob-5. In other words, if those who were defrauded consisted solely of 
holders, would the SEC have jurisdiction to maintain an enforcement ac-
tion under Rule 1 Ob-5 (or the Department of Justice a criminal prosecu-
tion under the Rule)? No precedent has so held, although Dabit now 
stands for just that proposition. 
The Court thus concludes that because its precedents construed Rule 
10b-5 broadly, and Blue Chip Stamps only decided who has standing to 
maintain a private damage action, Congress must have intended that the 
phrase "purchase and sell" have the same meaning in SLUSA as in the 
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Supreme Court's Rule 10b-5 cases (other than Blue Chip Stamps).28 
While there is some force to this approach, it has two problems. First, 
none of these cases turned on the meaning of "purchase and sale," and 
second, Blue Chip Stamps was not as policy-based as the Court suggest-
ed. The latter point is addressed in the next section. 
II. Blue Chip Stamps Revisited 
Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous court in Dabit,29 character-
ized Blue Chip Stamps as a case "[r]elying principally on 'policy consid-
erations."'30 One might take issue with this characterization. While Jus-
tice Rehnquist, who wrote the majority opinion for a divided court,31 did 
discuss why denying standing to the plaintiff class in Blue Chip Stamps 
was sound policy, the opinion may not rest "primarily" on policy consid-
erations.32 For starters, Rehnquist's opinion cites an earlier, widely adopt-
ed opinion by the Second Circuit, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,33 
which did not consider policy at all in concluding that Rule 10b-5 provid-
ed a remedy only to purchasers and sellers of securities. Indeed the Birn-
baum court correctly saw Rule 10b-5 as filling a gap in the anti-fraud 
coverage of the federal securities laws, because section 17 (a) of the Secu-
rities Act of 1933 prohibited fraud in connection with the sale of securi-
ties, but no provision expressly prohibited fraud in connection with the 
purchase of securities. To cover this gap, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission adopted Rule 1 Ob-5 pursuant to its rulemaking authority un-
der section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 
Second, Justice Rehnquist relied on Congressional determinations in 
1957 and 1959 to decline the invitation of the SEC to broaden section 
1 O(b) to cover "any attempt to purchase or sell . . . any security."34 Such 
reliance is similar to relying on legislative history, but quite dissimilar 
from a policy-based analysis. Finally, the Justice carefully analyzed the 
"Congressional scheme"35 of the federal securities laws to support the 
holding. This scheme clearly indicated Congress's intent that "purchase 
and sale" be read literally: "It would indeed be anomalous to impute to 
Congress an intention to expand the plaintiff class for a judicially implied 
cause of action beyond the bounds it delineated for comparable express 
causes of action."36 Only after all of the foregoing analysis did Justice 
Rehnquist turn to policy considerations. 
Indeed, rather than characterize policy considerations as of primary con-
cern, one might view Blue Chip Stamps as a case in which policy consider-
ations merely added weight to a holding supported on other bases. Justice 
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Stevens, however, faced a dilemma by viewing Blue Chip Stamps in this 
light. If Blue Chip Stamps rested on a narrow interpretation of section 1 O(b ), 
and since Congress used the same language in SLUSA, the latter statute must 
have the same meaning. To avoid this dilemma, Justice Stevens had to char-
acterize Blue Chip Stamps as resting on policy considerations. 
Blue Chip Stamps was not, however, the only obstacle which the Court 
faced in Dabit. Giving an expansive reading to SLUSA meant narrowing 
the freedom of the states to provide a class action remedy. The Court rec-
ognized this: "In concluding that SLUSA pre-empts state-law holder 
class-action claims of the kind alleged in Dabit's complaint, we do not 
lose sight of the general 'presum[ption] that Congress does not cavalierly 
pre-empt state-law causes of action.'"37 
While the Court responded to this argument, noting that SLUSA "does 
not actually pre-empt any state cause of action ... [because] [i]t simply 
denies plaintiffs the right to use the class action device to vindicate cer-
tain claims,"38 there is another aspect of preemption, or at least federal-
ism, that should have been considered. That aspect is discussed in the 
next section. 
III. The Federalism Concern 
Dabit is now the fifth case decided under the federal securities laws 
since 1997 that has had the effect of displacing state law.39 In the first of 
these, United States v. 0 'Hagan,40 the Court endorsed the misappropria-
tion theory under Rule 1 Ob-5. As a result, it is a crime under the federal 
securities laws for a person to purchase securities on the basis of informa-
tion entrusted to him about the issuer of those securities unless the pro-
vider of the information consents to such use.41 Such misuse, or misap-
propriation, of confidential information is a fraud in connection with the 
purchase of securities because the purchaser "defrauded" the provider of 
the information, and did so in connection with a securities transaction. 42 
Thus, what might otherwise be characterized, and treated, as a state law · 
breach of fiduciary duty has become, under 0 'Hagan, a federal crime. 
While the states could conceivably regulate such conduct, the incentive to 
do so, and the normal range of options that a state might consider, are 
mooted by the 0 'Hagan decision. 
Following O'Hagan, the Court decided Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. Unit-
ed International Holdings, Inc.,43 which, like 0 'Hagan, was a decision 
that federalized an area of common law. Wharf involved the question of 
whether a contracting party's failure to disclose its intent not to honor an 
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oral commitment to sell stock to the plaintiff under certain agreed-upon 
circumstances constituted fraud under Rule lOb-5.44 The Court thus had 
to decide whether an oral option (as it characterized the parties' agree-
ment) was a security and whether the defendant's "secret reservation" 
amounted to an actionable misrepresentation. 45 The Court decided both 
issues in favor of the plaintiff.46 Thus, a transaction that, on its face, ap-
pears to be a simple common law breach of contract, was transformed by 
the Court into a federal cause of action. Whether this area of law, tradi-
tionally relegated to the states, should as a matter of policy fall under the 
federal securities laws did not merit any comment from the Court. 
A year after Wharf, the Court followed the same tack in SEC v. Zand-
ford, 47 a case involving a theft by a broker from his customers' brokerage 
account. On its face, the defendant's conduct is a classic example of 
breach of fiduciary duty and common law theft. The SEC, however, 
sought a remedy under Rule lOb-5, arguing that the defendant's theft was 
"in connection with the purchase and sale" of a security and, therefore, in 
violation of the Rule.48 The Supreme Court, reversing the Fourth Circuit, 
agreed.49 Citing 0 'Hagan, the Court took an expansive view of the "in 
connection with" language and concluded that the scheme to misappro-
priate the proceeds of the sale of securities was enough to satisfy the re-
quirements of the Rule. 5° As in Wharf, the Court took an aggressive view 
of the reach of the federal securities laws, and enlarged the jurisdiction of 
the SEC. The transaction in Zandford, like that in Wharf, had no effect on 
integrity of the securities markets and thus there was little reason to bring 
it within federal securities laws. 51 
The fourth case decided by the Court, SEC v. Edwards,52 fits neatly 
into this pattern as well. Edwards involved the definition of a security, in 
this case a sale of payphones to investors with ancillary agreements that 
essentially assigned to the promoters the responsibility of managing the 
phones and promised the investors a fixed return. 53 The Court ruled that 
transaction amounted to security under the definition announced in SEC 
v. W.J. Howey54 for an investment contract: "an investment of money in a 
common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of oth-
ers."55 The Court's opinion does not, however, consider whether, in fact, 
there was a common enterprise. The facts in Edwards may not satisfy the 
prevailing concepts of common enterprise - that there must be horizontal 
commonality where the investors' money is pooled. 56 Judge Lay, of the 
Fourth Circuit, who concurred in the appellate court's decision in Ed-
[VOL. 34:3 2006] FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF HOLDERS' CLASS ACTIONS 215 
wards, observed that there was no pooling of funds. 57 Removing horizon-
tal commonality from the definition of an investment contract would ex-
pand the definition of a security and, thus, the reach of the federal securi-
ties laws. As in 0 'Hagan and Zandford, what would otherwise be garden 
variety state law claims are now federal securities law violations. 
The final and most recent case decided by the Court before Dabit, 
Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo,58 seemingly does not fit this pattern. 
On close examination, however, it may. Dura decided what constitutes 
"loss causation" in a Rule 10b-5 action. 59 The plaintiff had alleged that 
misrepresentations made by the corporate defendant had artificially in-
flated the purchase price for the company's stock and that plaintiff thus 
suffered a loss at the time of purchase. 60 The Court, reversing the Ninth 
Circuit, held that loss causation requires more than just purchasing stock 
at an inflated price. Rather, the Court suggested that the complaint should 
"claim that Dura's share price fell significantly after the truth became 
known .... "61 Interestingly, the Court grounded this conclusion on its 
view of the common law, 62 thus preserving the link between Rule 1 Ob-5 
actions and common law fraud. 63 
The common law basis for Dura's conclusion is not beyond question. 
As an initial matter, common law cases do support the plaintiff's argu-
ment that paying an inflated price constitutes a loss64 and no less an au-
thority than the Supreme Court itself so determined. In Sigafus v. Porter65 
the Court accepted the common law proposition that loss causation is de-
termined by calculating the difference between the purchase price of the 
security and the "true" value of the security at the time of purchase. 66 The 
Court supported its holding in Sigafus with an English common law pre-
cedent. 67 Other precedents, 68 and common sense, support the notion that 
a person suffers a loss at the time of purchase. The stock may never de-
cline in value, even a:fter the truth of the misrepresentation is disclosed, 
because other factors caused the stock to increase. Yet plaintiff can still 
claim a loss because, had the truth been known when he purchased the 
stock, the total increase in value that the plaintiff realized would have 
been greater. 
There are, to be sure, precedents that support the Court's view of loss cau-
sation. 69 But to a large extent these cases and, indeed, Dura itself, represent 
an adaptation of the elements of common law to a Rule 1 Ob-5 action involv-
ing publicly-traded securities. As a matter of policy, not necessarily common 
law, proof of loss causation may require that plaintiff allege more than pur-
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chase-time loss. On the other hand, it seems unjust, and unprecedented, to 
hold a purchaser of stock in a nonpublic company to the same standard. 70 In 
that instance, subsequent disclosure will not provide the critical evidence of 
plaintiff's loss; that disclosure will only constitute some sort of notice to 
plaintiff that it has a claim for a loss incurred at the time of purchase. One per-
verse effect of Dura may be to alter the common law view of loss causation in 
fraudulent misrepresentation cases. 71 At best, however, Rule 1 Ob-5 is further 
unmoored from the state law concepts of fraud from which it emanated. 
rv. Conclusion 
While one can quibble with the Court's reasoning and the parsing of its 
precedents, Dabit is by no means an unprecedented or unreasoned deci-
sion. The Court is surely correct that Congress sought to limit securities 
class action litigation based on state law and, we can safely speculate, 
would have approved of language incorporating the result in Dabit. More-
over, holders' actions are, by their very nature, troubling class actions. The 
Court was correct, as was the Court in Blue Chip Stamps, to note the large 
potential for abuse in these sorts of class actions. Plaintiffs with strong cas-
es can, as the Court noted, maintain their action as· individual actions (or 
joined with up to 49 others) under state law. What they are deprived of is 
the special leverage that a class action gives to the plaintiff class. From a 
public policy perspective, that's not such a bad thing. 
What is troubling about Dabit, and the Court's other recent precedents 
in the area of the federal securities laws, is the short shrift that these cases 
give to state law. The Court's passing reference to the presumption 
against preemption rings hollow; one might reasonably ask whether state 
law procedural rules - in this case rules that allowed holders' class ac-
tions - should be "cavalierly" pre-empted. Dabit is just another instance 
of the declining importance of state ·law in the securities arena. 
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